BLUEMASSMED OPERATIONAL SCENARIO 2.

TERRORISM AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Developed by FR PN.

INDEX

1.   Introduction.

The purpose of this document is to define the operational scenarios to be used in order to test the operational effectiveness of the Blue Mass Med network.

The operational scenarios provide the background required in order to promote the validation of all BMM System Services and the Information Exchange Requirements (basic and non basic) between the nodes of the network, and therefore, the scenarios describe the tasks and activities, operational elements, and information exchanges required to accomplish the mission.

This document has to be read in conjunction with the latest edition of the BMM Demonstration Plan.

In the following sections a detail description of one operational scenario. All the information provided is fictional and the only purpose is to help to test the network and the services. The basic / non basic information which is intended to be exchanged between BMM partners is fictional, and therefore the issue of whether the information is unclassified / sensitive or classified is not applicable in the context of this document.

This operational scenario promotes the exchange of information based on an existing Shared Basic Common Maritime Picture (SBCMP) and they are designed to use all the services available, both core services and common services. In this regard, the scenario should provide opportunities to create new tracks, to update existing tracks, to assign or modified track numbers, or the deletion of an existing track. They also provide opportunities to exchange track historic data among the authorised nodes, to communicate among the nodes (via internet type e-mail, chats, IP phoning, etc...), to exchange imagery products (static media files, streaming media file, including satellite imagery) or to exchange mapping information.

NOTE

- This operational scenario has been developed with the most current technical information available and it will be adapted to the services and information exchange requirements implemented by each node.
- It is imperative that the individual nodes with active involvement in this scenario check the feasibility to perform the tasks specified. In any case will inform the designated PN responsible person the availability of its node to conduct the operational demonstration.

---

2.   General description of the Scenario.

This BMM Operational Scenario has an initial description in which it is explained in general terms the initial situation and the surrounding circumstances. Starting form the initial situation the scenario is developed with different actions occurring upon which the BMM partners take measures to prevent the dangerous situation form occurring or to mitigate the effects.

Following the description there is a graphical map of the scenario, and a list of injections and the information exchange occurring amongst BMM partners.

The exact format of the information exchange will be established during the trials in accordance with the services developed by each node.

Finally a list of the partners involved in each scenario is shown.

Vignette 2 : Terrorism WMD

Description

EUROPOL has reported to competent authorities in M.S that a jihadist terrorist group has taken a couple of dirty CBRN devices into a general cargo ship while anchored a port of South Red Sea area.

EUROPOL doesn't have information on the name of the vessel but informs that she has left the port at least 10 days ago and it is estimated to be bound for an intermodal port facilities belonging to a BMM state members. Information gained by Europol has been released 2 days ago. So the suspected vessel may already have crossed the Suez canal if she is transiting towards eastbound Mediterranean. She may also be transiting around Africa and may close West Gibraltar within the next few hours.

The alleged intent of the terrorists is to make the bombs go off on the docks, generating havoc, contaminating the area and therefore preventing regular maritime commercial activities and damaging world trade while creating instability in relevant trade hubs in the western Mediterranean. Previous intelligence analysis estimates that the most important impact would be the closing of the strait of Gibraltar but a target as Marseille or Barcelona cannot be ruled out. Agencies supported by BMM system will try to identify, track and interdict this threat as far away from coastline as possible.

French PN informs BMM community. BMM member states agree to plan a collaborative effort to carry out search and surveillance activities, data mining, data analysis and correlation, and to exchange information regarding these ships. BMM recommends port authorities to increase ISPS security levels due to terrorist threat.

The collaborative effort of the BMM allows the location and identification of six vessels which

fulfil the profile provided by Interpol. Four of them are located in the eastern Mediterranean and two of them in the western Mediterranean due to the collaborative effort (data mining and active surveillance) of BMM partners.

Further information provided by Interpol and FR PN informs Master of one of the MV in western Mediterranean (MV Font Vella) has been previously involved in criminal activities. MV Font Vella is currently bound to Malta.

IT Navy and MT authority cooperate to interdict the vessel.

Events synthesis Map

Injections and Information Exchange.

T1: FR (PN) informs BMM of the situation and shares relevant information on the suspected vessel.

T2: FR (PN) requests information services. SP (Navy) and PT (PN) provide basic information (name, last port of call. ETD, port of destination, ETA, cargo and crew identity on four suspected vessels (MV 1, 2, 3 and 4) which fulfill the description provided by FR (PN). FR (PN) provides information on other two.

Two AIS tracks in the BMM SBCMP located in Eastern Med (MV1 and MV2).

T3: GR (PN) requests wide area mapping Easter Mediterranean (wide area suspect vessel detection service). All nodes subscribe. IT (PN) provides information.

One additional contact in Central Mediterranean (MV3) but does not emit AIS anymore for few hours. GR deploys means in order to confirm MV1 and MV2 position and course. IT deploys means in order to relocate MV3.

T4: GR (PN) updates information and identifies the two vessels detected by wide area mapping (MV1 and 2). IT (PN) provides updated location of MV3.

T5: PT (PN) requests wide area mapping western med approaches. All nodes subscribe. IT (PN) provides with negative results.

T6: SP (GC) provides an alert about a motor vessel crossing the straight of Gibraltar and creates track on current position and provides video and pictures. (MV4)

All 4 vessels are identified, on SBCMP and declared as COI.

T7. FR (PN) informs MV (4) "Font Vella" master previously involved in criminal activities. She is currently bound to Malta.

T8: IT Navy and MT authority cooperate to interdict the vessel.

Expected results

The collaborative effort of BMM partners prevents a maritime terrorist act by sharing relevant information, identifying suspected vessels and executing maritime interdiction operation on terrorist vessels

Partners Involved.

BMM:
France, Italy, Malta, Greece, Spain, Portugal

Others

EUROPOL.

Comments.

3.   General Animation Plan.

3.1.   Ship's Track Information.

TRACK NUMBER 1				
NAME	FLAG	SPEED	LAST PORT OF CALL	DESTINATION

POSITION	P1	P2	P3	P4	P5	P6	P7	
TIME								
EVENT								

3.2.   General Animation Plan.

Time REF	Timing / T0 (virtual)	True DTG	Target ship behaviour	Key event	Relevant data injection	Partner in charge of injection: FROM	Partners receiving the data/info: TO	Assets deployment actions	Service requests & publication
T0	TBD	XX0700Z MAR 12	No behaviour	- Start of vignette - All Partners involved ready	Nil	No injection		No assets specifically deployed at T0	Nil
T1	+ 0.5hr	XX0730Z MAR 12	No behaviour	FR sends an alert on suspicion on unknown general cargo having called in a South Red Sea harbour and left this harbour D-10 and D-45	*search for general cargo having called called in a South Red Sea harbour, leaving this harbour D-10 and D-45 and heading towards a harbour of BMM countries. *high priority . *suspicion of link	FR → This kind of info coming from EUROPOL would be first known by Police so the SN would be the one of the border police.	Ideally ALL	*Decision upon every partner *orders to be given to all assets for watchout. * all partners to crosscheck with the harbours authorities IOT find ships bound and arriving from	FR add ship in BMM COI list (ACU) FR sends a notification to all BMM with relevant info.

					with terrorism. * report to ALL every corresponding vessel and request for not acting at sea. * high level of confidentiality				Yemen or more largely Suez Canal	
T2	+ 6hr	XX0800Z MAR 12	No behaviour	FR requests information service	FR sends message to ALL requesting status of their search	FR *Maritime prefect*	Ideally ALL : integration in SBCMP	No deployment	Use of track exchange common service
T3	+ 8hr	XX0900Z MAR 12	4 suspect vessels sailing	Answers from partners: * SP * PT * FR Each partner has to identify the source of information (ex: FR data comes from AIS signals picked up Red Sea by French navy)	Each partner provides : *name of vessel *flag *IMO *MMSI *LPOC & ETD *NPOC & ETA *last known POS	* SP * PT * FR	Ideally all PN and SN: integration in SBCMP	No assets deployed	Response from partners either directly injected is SBCMP or displayed in a separate window for investigation.
T4	+ 24hr	XX1100z MAR 12	No vessel located, the 4 vessels reported are	GR requests a wide area mapping Eastern Mediterranean sea	Request	GR	Ideally ALL	To be determined by all partners	Use of wide area mapping service. Positive or

			assessed to sail independently						negative response from partners according to coverage and availability of sat info.
T5	+25hr	XX1130Z MAR 12	/	GR (SN) reports in SBCMP 2 additional contact gained by AIS One of these contacts was released by FR (PN) as observed in Bab el Mandeb strait at T2	Tracks of 2 contacts gained by AIS, MV 1an 2	GR (SN)	Ideally all PN and SN: integration in SBCMP	GR (SN) informs all partners that a MPA is sent to correlate info	Track exchange service
T6	+ 31hr	XX1300Z MAR 12	Ships sailing	GR (SN) updates data on the two tracks	For MV1 and 2: *PSN *course/speed *last port of call *next port of call *picture	GR (SN)	Ideally all PN and SN: integration in SBCMP	No assets deployed All parners to conduct internal investigation on ships spotted as the ETA is closing	Track exchange service
T7	T+48hr	XX1400Z MAR 12	Ships sailing	PT (PN) requests a wide area mapping for western med approaches as its authorities want to verify that no ship	Request	PT (PN)	Ideally all PN and SN	To be determined by all partners	Use of wide area mapping service. Positive or negative response

			coming from the horn of Africa area is-sailing in the vicinity						from partners according to coverage and availability of sat info.
T8	T+50hr	XX1430Z MAR 12	Ships sailing	Result of wide area mapping by IT	Message of negative result	IT (PN)	Ideally all PN and SN	no	
T9	T+52hr	XX1500Z MAR 12	Ships sailing	Following PT 'request), SP (PN-GC) provides an alert on two ships having crossed the STROG and declaring having called in Yemen in the last weeks	For MV3 and 4: *PSN *course/speed *last port of call *next port of call *picture	SP (PN-GC)	Ideally all PN and SN: integration in SBCMP	All partners answer with list of assets in vicinity being alerted and capable of surveillance and interdiction if necessary	Use of notification service. Email sent by partners with assets situation.
			4 Ships are sailing towards their declared next ports of call	SP (PN-GC+Navy) declare MV 3 and 4 as COI GR (SN) declare MV 1 and 2 inside its Area of interest as COI MT (SN) declare MV 3 and 4 as COI	Tracks changed to appear as COI	SP (PN) GR (SN) MT (SN)	Ideally all PN and SN: integration in SBCMP	All partners to assess their level of readiness and priority for interdiction of these 6 ships	Ships added to BMM COI list.
T10	T+73hr	XX1600Z MAR 12	Ships approaching their destination	FR (PN) informs that investigation on the 4 ships showed that the elements related to the MV 4 "Font Vella" are	Message sent with request for high priority for surveillance without boarding, specific	FR (PN)	To all PN and SN: *MV 4 under specific		Email or notification for sending the message.

				incoherent, shipowner probably linked or financed by terrorist organization	operation to be conducted		suspicion *request for assets close to the MV4 and on its route to Genoa **only to law enforcement partners:** interdiction at sea to be conducted, switch to other channels for coordinating the operation		Specific notification to law enforcement community. Deletion of MV1, 2, 3, 4, from BMM COI List ?
T11	T+96hr	XX1700Z MAR 12	Ship en route off Bonifacio strait	Ship boarded by FR with support of IT *(attention has to be paid that legalframework is missing in real world)*					Notification for boarding report and end of operation.

Note 1: System Services to be checked in accordance with annex II of the BMM Demonstration Plan and the latest version of the BMM System View. Identification of the Node requesting /providing the service is compulsory.

Note 2: Information Exchange Requirements in accordance with annex II of the BMM Demonstration Plan and the latest version of the BMM Operational View. Identification of the Node requesting / providing the Information is compulsory.

Note 3: Identification of the Nodes involved and their role.

Note 4: All Partners involved in the Scenarios check technical feasibility of the service and information exchange requested.

3.3. BMM Nodes Involvement.

The following chart depicts the different nodes and their involvement in this operational scenario.

BMM NODE	Nº VIGNETTE/ INJECTION	TIME REFERENCE	SHIP POSITION	SERVICE REQUESTED / PUBLICATION. (Note 5)	INFO EXCHANGE REQUESTED / PUBLICATION. (Note 5)
	Information to be inserted	Information to be inserted	Information to be inserted	Information to be inserted	Information to be inserted

Note 5: All Partners involved in the Scenarios check technical feasibility of the service and information exchange requested.